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Abstract 
Science impacts nearly all aspects of American society; however, the extent of this 
impact depends on favorable legislation. Given the key role Congress plays in policymaking, it is 
thus necessary to determine what factors cause legislators to change science policy, so that 
researchers can determine more successful ways of producing meaningful science policy outputs. 
I therefore measure the influence of eleven political variables on policy change in science and 
four other issue areas during thirty-one congressional terms. Results reveal that scholars need to 
identify a more effective method Congress can use to contemplate science policy change, which 
I propose needs to incorporate both expertise and citizen participation. I also demonstrate that 
conducting issue-specific studies augments the field of political science, by providing a more 
comprehensive understanding of congressional behavior that one cannot ascertain from 
aggregative studies alone.  
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Introduction 
 “The relationship between science and politics can be described as a recursive coupling 
of two interdependent developments—the scientification of politics and the politicization of 
science” (Weingart, 2002). Through case study analysis, science policy theorists argue that 
extensive use of scientific expertise in political processes weakens democracy by distancing 
citizens from technically driven policy decisions and simultaneously delegitimizes science by 
introducing political bias into the work of researchers (Jasanoff, 1987; Weingart, 2002; Jasanoff, 
2004; Mooney, 2005; Brown, 2006). However, in order to determine the role experts should play 
in politics, it is necessary to first quantify their impact on policy decisions in reality. Because 
aforementioned scholars rely on anecdotal evidence and do not discuss other political 
determinants that might be involved, existing research fails to adequately measure the influence 
expertise has on science policy change over time, an insufficiency this paper seeks to resolve.  
 This quantification of science policy change is also important for providing a more 
comprehensive understanding of congressional behavior. I discuss and test an existing theory, 
which claims that analyses of overall congressional legislating incompletely portray 
policymaking, because they do not account for variations in congressional behavior across issue-
areas (Lapinski, 2013). If results reveal that policy change determinants differ appreciably across 
the five issue areas this paper examines, then the study will require political scientists to 
supplement broad research with issue-specific studies.   
 Consequently, this paper asks the question: what political factors cause meaningful 
change in congressional science policy and how do these dynamics similarly influence change in 
other major issue areas, namely health, transportation, education and community development & 
housing (hereinafter CD&H)? When investigating general congressional behavior, scholars 
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suggest that partisan dynamics and external support from the president and public largely 
influence policy outcomes, due to pressure from party leaders and a need to secure future votes 
from constituents. Although minimally, academics also note that the size of the federal budget 
plays a role in shaping policy outcomes, by clarifying the feasibility of policy goals.  
 I expect that these determinants of general congressional policy change will influence 
some, if not all, of the issue areas in this study. Specifically, I hypothesize that expertise will 
have the largest effect on science policy change, with external support, partisan characteristics, 
and size of the federal budget having minimal impacts. Furthermore, I anticipate that explanatory 
variables for science will correspond highly with those for health and education, since subtopics 
in these areas often interrelate. Because transportation and CD&H are less prioritized, I predict 
these areas will depend mostly on the federal budget.  
 I test these hypotheses by examining Congressional Quarterly Almanac coverage of 
1,224 laws passed between the 80th and 111th Congresses, or between 1947 and 2010. By 
comparing highly differing trends in policy change across the five issue areas, I conclude that 
congressmen’s unique and exclusive reliance on expertise for science explains its relatively small 
policy output relative to other issue areas. I also determine that issue-specific investigations are 
necessary to supplement existing political science research.  
Why Congressional Science Policy? 
Both the executive and judicial branches can act as important sources of policy change; 
however, as the legislative branch of the United States, Congress undoubtedly plays the most 
direct and formative role in shaping American law. Scholars agree that Congress is in a 
“privileged position” to produce tangible “outputs” in health policy, foreign policy and other key 
issue areas (Adler and Lapinski, 2006), since the Constitution grants the Legislature direct 
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lawmaking powers. While they admit that other governmental actors, such as the president, 
participate in policymaking, political scientists conclude that the outcomes of actions put forth by 
other branches heavily depend upon congressional behavior.  
For instance, presidential success in Congress is contingent upon congressional 
perception of public support for the president (Rivers and Rose, 1985) and party composition of 
Congress (Cohen, 2012). In fact, Adler and Lapinski (2006) note that, even George W. Bush, 
who had relatively substantial agenda-setting power after the September 11th terrorist attacks, 
rarely saw his policy proposals come to fruition in Congress during 2003 and 2004, unless they 
related to security and defense (Babington, 2004). Clearly, presidential policymaking capability 
largely rests on Congress’s willingness to support his initiatives.  
Likewise, although the judiciary has some lawmaking power, primarily through settling 
conflicting understandings of law, courts can only interpret and apply law that others have 
already legislated (Schauer, 1983). It cannot simply create law that did not previously exist in 
some form. Congress is thus the “institution where the collective choice of the nation is forged 
into outcomes” (Adler and Lapinski, 2006, p. 3), so understanding the factors that influence 
congressional decision-making is crucial to understanding legislation both broadly and for 
specific issue areas. 
Issue Substance is Fundamental to Understanding Congressional Lawmaking  
 Determining the dynamics that shape science-specific and other topic-specific policy 
change is not only valuable for those interested in science issues, but also for the general field of 
political science. Aggregating all policy into a general unit deceptively exaggerates the 
predictability of congressional behavior, through ignoring the potential for variation across 
different issue areas. By focusing on congressional tendencies in specific issue areas, scholars 
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can acquire a “more accurate picture” of how Congress makes policy decisions (Lapinski, 2013, 
p. 160). Lapinski (2013) explains that early research assessed how congressional propensities 
differed based on changes in types and content of policy issues, thereby vastly advancing 
political scientists’ understanding of legislation (Lowi, 1964,1970, 1972; Clausen, 1967, 1973; 
Mayhew, 1966; and Clausen & Cheney, 1970). However, as later work eliminated this focus on 
issue areas and fixated on trends in general policy, scholars began 
“mischaracterize[ing]…policymaking process[es]” and making “incorrect inferences about 
lawmaking” (Lapinski, 2013, p. 181).  
 Lapinski substantiates this claim by discussing his case study analysis of polarization in 
Congress. He notes that literature depicts a certain trend in polarization as fact: “polarization has 
been increasing since the 1970s, and…has followed a U-shaped form across the last 130 years of 
American history” (Lapinski, 2013; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006). Yet, when Lapinski 
reassesses this claim by disaggregating policy into different issue areas, he finds that this picture 
is actually more complicated. Specifically, while party polarization is consistently present in both 
chambers of Congress for domestic issues and therefore does not follow this U-shaped curve, 
developments in polarization for sovereignty issues and international affairs are much more 
volatile. In fact, large declines in polarization occur between the 1930s and ‘70s for sovereignty-
related issues and for international affairs, while polarization remains at constantly high levels 
for domestic topics. In other words, members’ decision-making process fluctuates across issue 
areas. Lapinski (2013) thus concludes that identifying the factors influencing change in specific 
policy areas, such as science, advances the field of political science by providing a more 
exhaustive explanation of lawmaking and by decreasing the likelihood that that researchers make 
the costly mistake of “getting it wrong” through generalizations (p.181).  
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Quantification of Policy Change 
Given the key role of Congress in promoting scientific progress and the importance of 
issue substance studies in advancing political science research, it is essential to quantify and 
explain congressional science policy change over time, in relation to other topic areas. Adler & 
Wilkerson (2009) clarify that policy is a culmination of many laws, distinct from lawmaking, 
which focuses more on discrete legislative acts. It is clear that policy change is important for 
understanding congressional behavior and legislative patterns, as many scholars have conducted 
research in this area (Adler & Wilkerson, 2009; Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; 
Birkland, 1997).   
Some scholars have attempted to quantify policy change with equations, such as “100 * 
[(Number of Issue Area Additions + Number of Issue Area Deletions)/(Number of Issue Areas 
Retained from Previous Congress)]” (Cohen, 2006). Although this type of measure decently 
describes changes in the size of policy agendas, it fails to capture meaningful changes in policy 
content. For instance, Congress could pass less science policies than did the previous Congress, 
but these new policies might have much more significant effects on scientific research.  
Adler & Wilkerson (2009; 2012) use a more effective method, which quantifies the 
degree of meaningful policy change in a topic as the amount of Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac (hereinafter CQ) coverage for that issue area. The authors explain that CQ provides 
“policymakers, lobbyists, academics, and other congressional observers” with consequential 
legislation that “mattered most in a given year,” thereby focusing on significant policy (Adler & 
Wilkerson, 2009, p. 6). Using the CQ dataset that Policy Agendas Project (PAP) provides, the 
scholars define policy change as “the sum of CQ article lines devoted to a given [topic] during a 
given congressional term” (p. 6).  
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The scholars justify use of this measure by citing other studies that equate CQ lines of 
coverage to policy significance (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier & Sinclair-Chapman, 2003; 
Edwards, Barrett, & Peake, 1997; Carson, Finocchiaro & Rohde, 2010; Mayhew, 1991; Sinclair, 
1995; and Stimson, MacKuen & Erickson, 1995). They further validate this measure by finding 
that the most important laws according to CQ coverage highly coincide with those found in the 
Mayhew (1991) “list of ‘most innovative and consequential’ laws,” as well as those emerging 
from the policy significance scores Clinton and Lapinski (2006) use to identify meaningful 
legislation (Adler & Wilkerson, 2012, p. 173-174).  
While the authors admit there is not a perfect standard to validate CQ coverage as a 
measure of significant policy change, they argue based on the aforementioned evidence that CQ 
coverage sufficiently describes policy substance and that a change in the amount of coverage 
represents meaningful policy change within issue areas. This paper thus makes the same 
assumption and uses fluctuations in CQ coverage between 1947 and 2010 as a measure of policy 
change in science and the other four analyzed topic areas.   
Trends in Science Policy and its Comparison to other Topic Areas 
	
Figure 1: Total Number of CQ Column Lines per Congress Discussing Passed Science Laws. Data is taken from 
Policy Agendas Project Congressional Quarterly Almanac dataset.			
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Figure 2: Total Number of CQ Column Lines per Congress Discussing Passed Health Laws. Data is taken from 
Policy Agendas Project Congressional Quarterly Almanac dataset.  
 
	
Figure 3: Total Number of CQ Column Lines per Congress Discussing Passed Transportation Laws. Data is taken 
from Policy Agendas Project Congressional Quarterly Almanac dataset.  
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Figure 4: Total Number of CQ Column Lines per Congress Discussing Passed Education Laws. Data is taken from 
Policy Agendas Project Congressional Quarterly Almanac dataset.  
 
	
Figure 5: Total Number of CQ Column Lines per Congress Discussing Passed CD&H Laws. Data is taken from 
Policy Agendas Project Congressional Quarterly Almanac dataset.  	 As the role of science in society continues to grow (Weingart, 2002; Price, 1971), one 
would expect that science policy is correspondingly expanding over time. However, Congress 
has actually passed a decreasing amount of meaningful science legislation over the last sixty-two 
years (Figure 1). The largest and virtually singular development in science policy occurred 
between the 87th and 94th Congresses, or during the 1960s and early 1970s, and has steadily 
declined thereafter. Also noteworthy, the Congresses serving between 2001 and 2010 troublingly 
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returned to the almost nonexistent levels of science legislation during the 1950s Legislatures, a 
decade during which the apparent role of science in society had barely begun to emerge in 
America (Rossiter 1985).  
 Although these trends in science are seemingly disappointing, they are not entirely 
unique. The volume of significant transportation, education and CD&H legislation has similarly 
decreased but at even faster rates (Figures 3, 4, and 5). Notwithstanding a minor increase in 
transportation policy during the 109th Congress (2005-2007), these issue areas also experienced a 
similar return to 1950s legislative trends in the final decade examined. One might wonder if the 
decline in science policy therefore simply represents diminishing legislative behavior overall; 
however, figure 2 suggests otherwise. Passage of significant health policy has increased at a 
relatively rapid rate, even during the latest decade, thereby suggesting policy change does vary in 
magnitude and direction between issue areas.  
Further demonstrating this variation, there are important characteristics unique to science 
policy change. Most notably, the amount of CQ science coverage ranges between 0 and 4,000 
lines of law, while the other four areas experience ranges between 0 and at least 10,000. In fact, 
the other issue areas receive, on average, between 2,200 and 3,700 CQ lines of coverage per 
year, while science receives only 1,370 lines of coverage on average per year (PAP, 2014). Not 
only does science therefore experience generally smaller outputs of meaningful policy, but it also 
remains highly constant, while the other areas experience drastic spikes of growth and decline. 
For instance, the other four topics all radically increase in policy during the 89th Congress, while 
science actually declines. Similarly, science policy experiences its largest growth between the 
91st and 93rd Congresses, when three of the other four issue areas either decrease in significant 
policy outcomes or remain constant.   
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Because science policy changes in these distinct ways, it is clear that the factors 
influencing policy in other issue areas likely have different or absent effects on science policy. 
One should thus wonder what influences science policy and why legislative action in this area is 
so minimal compared to that in the rest. 
Congressional Science Policy: the Weakness of Existing Theories 
 In the rare occasions scholars study science policy, they primarily examine either policy 
solutions for scientific issues (Schneider, 1989; Jones, 2010) or how science policy benefits the 
economy (Smith, 1990; OECD, 2000), national security, and health (Richter, 1995). Scholars 
thus usually focus on the effects, rather than the causes of science policies. The few scholars who 
do evaluate the factors influencing science policy choices often concentrate on the Cold War as a 
causal factor (Leslie, 1993; Rossiter, 1985). This research fails to explain science policy trends 
beyond the Cold War, as well as instances when science policy did not adequately reflect the 
war’s conditions. For example, large increases in significant science policy occur immediately 
after the Cuban Missile Crisis, which many consider to be the height of the Cold War, but also 
more appreciably when the US embraced détente, or relaxation of tensions, in the early ‘70s 
(Figure 1). Therefore, research needs to develop more timeless, encompassing theories to explain 
changes in science policy.  
A small subset of research investigates the process of science policymaking. However, 
these investigations advocate political processes theorists believe would produce the best science 
policy outcomes, such as citizen panels that combine expertise with public deliberation, while 
barely describing the science policymaking process as it actually exists in reality (Jasanoff 1987; 
Weingart, 2002; Jasanoff 2004; Mooney 2005; Brown 2006). Nevertheless, these scholars 
analyze some cases, such as those related to carcinogen regulation and genetically modified 
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food, and agree that “it has become common practice for…politics [to] request special scientific 
expertise,” because “scientific knowledge has been [historically] regarded as superior and of 
higher value than popular knowledge or ‘common sense” (Weingart, 2002, p. 2). The researchers 
suggest that scientists not only give advice to politicians, but they can also set the science policy 
agenda. For example, environmental issues and technology controversies did not arise as 
political issues, until scientists found pesticides in the food chain and released findings on the 
potential harm technology can cause (Weingart 2002, 1991). While these studies highlight a 
probable trend in politics, they do not control for other possible causal factors. To assess the 
validity of this consensus that political “decision-making [has become] more technical and 
expert-driven,” it is necessary to use a much larger number of policy cases and measure the 
effect of expertise on policy change over time (Dauvergne, 2005, p.369).  
Quantifying Issue Specialization 
One way to measure the influence of expertise on meaningful policy change is to 
investigate committee activity. According to Joseph Cooper, who scholars recognize as an expert 
in congressional committees, the committee system emerged “to make legislative specialization 
[or expertise] possible” (Cooper 1970; Gilligan & Krehbiel 1990, p. 536). Gilligan & Krehbiel 
(1990) likewise argue that committees provide “informational efficiency,” since committee 
members become specialists, by “obtain[ing] superior information about the consequences of 
various legislative alternatives” (p. 536). By obtaining “superior” information, committees allow 
“Congress to accomplish more with its limited manpower,” given that Congress is not capable of 
becoming experts in all policy initiatives, unless there is a division of labor (Adler &Wilkerson 
2012, p. 60; Talbert, Jones & Baumgartner, 1995).  
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A staff member from the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee explained that 
committees acquire a reputation for being experts on particular issues, because they get a referral 
for a particular bill, hold investigative hearings in which they invite expert witnesses to testify, 
and consequently obtain future jurisdiction over similar bills (Talbert, Jones & Baumgartner, 
1995). Legislative hearings, which investigate the implications of bills that were referred to the 
committee of jurisdiction, especially tend to invite experts who are both supporters and 
dissenters, thereby theoretically allowing committee members to gain balanced information 
about the relevant issue (Talbert, Jones & Baumgartner, 1995). Given committees’ clear role as 
issue experts in Congress, the level of committee activity is a valid proxy for issue specialization, 
since members obtain relevant bill information from field experts during hearings.  
Although science policy literature suggests a unique role of expertise in science policy 
outcomes, the efficiency that committees provide makes it possible that committee activity is a 
key determinant of policy change for other topic areas, as well. Increased committee activity, by 
expanding the amount of information Congress can acquire, should result in more policy change. 
In fact, scholars find that committees “control the pace and direction of policy change within 
their jurisdiction” (Adler & Lapinski, 2009; Deering & Smith, 1997; Fenno, 1973; Weingast & 
Marshall, 1988). Committee activity is thus a likely indicator of policy change within specific 
topic areas.   
Other Factors Causing Congressional Policy Change 
 Papers discussing the relationship between experts and science policy do not control for 
other possible causal factors, making it necessary to measure the effect of additional political 
variables. In turn, I examine theories of general congressional behavior and test how well they 
apply to science policy specifically. Such theories recognize many predictors of general policy 
		 15	
change, which I will categorize broadly as: partisan characteristics of government, external mood 
and support, and size of the federal budget.  
Partisan Characteristics of Government 
With antipathy between Republicans and Democrats currently reaching a peak (Pew 
Research Center, 2014), it does not seem unlikely that party preferences could significantly 
shape policy change in certain issue areas. Scholarly research supports this assumption, as 
McMonagle (2008) notes that some members “vote primarily based on their party affiliation or 
party leadership pressures” (p. 109). Likewise, Berry, Burden & Howell (2006) examine every 
federal discretionary program created between 1974 and 2004 and find that changes in 
congressional partisan compositions leads to changes in the durability of these programs, 
suggesting that the party composition of Congress affects policy change and stability. These 
findings likely apply to specific issue areas, as well, since other studies discover that party 
composition of Congress has a large influence on environmental policy (Shipan and Lowry, 
2001) and economic policy, but minimal influence on defense (Snyder & Groseclose, 2000).  
Issue Ownership literature further implicates political party as a factor influencing policy 
outcomes. These works argue that certain issues are “owned” by each party, so when America is 
facing problems, the party that owns those problems has an advantage in getting elected 
(Petrocik, Benoit, & Hansen, 2013). A party owns a topic when the public consensus assigns 
higher trust to one party for that topic (Egan, 2013). Egan (2013) finds that Democrats own issue 
areas, such as health, education, and the environment, and Republicans own crime, the military, 
and taxes. Although this literature associates issue ownership with campaign outcomes, it is 
likely that issue ownership also plays a role in policy outcomes, since parties are intuitively more 
likely to pass more policies in issue areas that will secure their future elections.   
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Party composition of Congress in relation to the executive branch is another explanatory 
factor that political scientists often cite as influencing policy change. In fact, Binder (2003) 
explains that divided government, in which the party of the president differs from at least one 
legislative chamber, “erects [a] barrier in the legislative process” and “traps bills that might have 
been enacted had control of government been unified in a single political party” (p.67). 
Numerous other studies support this claim, arguing that divided government reduces policy 
action (Mayhew, 1991; Howell, Adler, Cameron & Riemann, 2000; and Maltzman & Shipan, 
2008). Cohen (2012) adds to this literature, by suggesting that party separation between the 
executive and legislative branches hinders policy change even more than party division within 
congressional chambers. He argues that congressional members who are not members of the 
president’s party are less likely to feel pressured to support and act on his policy agenda 
preferences.  
However, Nicholson-Crotty & Miller (2011) contrarily assert that governments controlled 
by both parties actually provide policymakers with more “discretion” and “room to innovate 
policy solutions,” because diminished pressure to conform to party practices increases 
productivity. Adding to the disagreement, Mayhew (1991) and Krehbiel (1998) actually find that 
there is no difference in policy outcomes between unified and divided governments. One 
possible explanation for these incompatible findings is that divided government affects policy 
change differently within different issue areas. It is therefore worth investigating the role divided 
government plays in science and the other four examined topics.    
External Mood and Support 
The president does not simply influence Congress through partisan dynamics, but also 
through agenda-setting. Most scholars contend that “no other single actor in the political system 
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has quite the capability of the president to set agendas in given policy areas” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 
23; Gelman, Wilkenfeld & Adler, 2015, p.2). Scholars provide three reasons for the president’s 
critical role in the policymaking process. First, the president’s policy agenda largely influences 
the congressional legislative agenda, as “over 70 percent of the president’s issue priorities get 
congressional consideration” (Gelman et al., 2015, p. 2; Edwards and Barrett, 2000; Peterson, 
1990). Furthermore, presidential policy proposals provide opportunities to shift the focus of the 
legislative agenda to new policy areas (Gelman et al., 2015). Lastly, legislators often base their 
support for policies merely on the fact that presidents are recommending them (Gelman et al., 
2015; Lee, 2009). Given that the President so frequently influences congressional policy activity, 
it is likely that the president’s party likewise contributes to policy change.  
It is important to note that presidential sway fluctuates throughout his time in office. 
Presidential impact is especially high during the honeymoon phase, because elections indicate 
“what ‘the people’ expect from their representatives as they head to Washington” (Beckman & 
Godfrey, 2007, p.250). Therefore, when the public chooses a president, they expect that 
Congress will enact his agenda. Similarly, when presidents are running for reelection, they are 
more likely to recommend policies that have strong public backing, which Congress will thus be 
less likely to resist (Cohen, 2012). However, lame-duck presidents, or presidents in office after a 
new president has been elected, experience a 38% decline in legislative success, because 
Congress no longer sees a need to support their agenda (Cohen, 2012). 
 Apparent in these trends is the role of the public in shaping congressional support for the 
president. In fact, the public provides an extra source of external support that may even be more 
influential, since members of Congress hope to get reelected (Adler & Wilkerson, 2005; Binder, 
2003). A 1998 study found that between 1960 and 1979, policy outcomes reflected public 
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opinion on 63% of cases, although declining to 55% between 1980 and 1993 (Monroe, 1998). 
Furthermore, science policy subtopics, such as the environment and energy, had among the 
highest consistency between policy outcomes and public opinion compared to most other issue 
areas (Monroe, 1998). Adler & Wilkerson (2012) explain that “lawmakers…should…mobilize 
around and respond to issues that have the public’s attention” (p. 152). The scholars use the 
Stimson and Coggins Policy Moods dataset, which aggregates responses to survey questions and 
quantifies the public’s broad support for legislative action, and find that public mood 
significantly contributes to policy change in half of their models (Adler & Wilkerson, 2012). It is 
therefore worthwhile to assess the role of public opinion on science policy, in comparison to the 
four other issue areas.  
In addition to measuring public opinion directly, one might also indirectly gauge public 
enthusiasm for certain types of policy through religiosity measures. Koopman (2009) explores 
how religion molds American public policy and identifies at least five policy types that are 
characterized as “morality policies”. For example, he discusses the study Colby & Baker 
conducted in 1988, which finds that religious communities associated homosexuality with AIDS 
and consequently were less willing to spend money on education, prevention, and treatment for 
AIDS. This example clearly demonstrates how religion can hinder education, health, and science 
policy. Similarly, religious populations have tended to oppose sex education in public schools, 
forcing the lawmakers who passed relevant legislation to minimize its implementation 
(Koopman, 2009). Religious contention with abortion has likewise interfered with science policy 
efforts to fund stem cell research, while the belief in creationism prevents religious groups from 
supporting public school education of evolution. Koopman concludes by highlighting the overall 
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failure Congress experiences when trying to enact these morality policies. This literature 
suggests that religion must influence at least some areas of policy change.  
Federal Budget   
 Size of the federal budget also contributes to the political environment in Congress. 
Cohen (2012) explains that higher deficits constrain legislative action, because there are less 
spending opportunities. Furthermore, non-fiscal policies, such as those related to science, might 
be especially unsuccessful (Cohen, 2012). Light (2000) similarly argues that large budget deficits 
limit the government’s ability to tackle issues, especially inhibiting spending for initiatives in 
new policy areas. In turn, lawmakers focus primarily on the less costly process of enhancing 
existing programs, rather than producing meaningful policy change.  
 The federal budget also plays an important role in agenda setting. Eshbaugh-Soha (2005) 
reports that budget deficits shrink the president’s policy agenda in terms of both overall size and 
the number of issue areas included. As aforementioned scholars attest, the presidential agenda 
significantly shapes the congressional agenda. Consequently, if the federal budget determines the 
size of the presidential agenda, it should likewise influence the scope of the congressional 
agenda. DiNitto & Johnson (2012) summarize the budget’s impact on lawmaking, by describing 
it as “the single most important policy statement,” which “lies at the heart of all public policies” 
(p. 23). They further argue that the size of the budget clarifies who in society benefits and who 
pays the costs. Based on Cohen’s (2012) argument, non-fiscal areas would pay the cost of 
diminished policy attention during higher deficits, while they would receive the benefits during 
surpluses. Clearly, the budget plays an important role in setting legislative priorities and defining 
Congress’s freedom to take initiative in new policy areas.  
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Methodology 
 All of the aforementioned variables should play some role in policymaking; however, the 
degree to which they significantly affect policy change likely varies between issue areas. Hence, 
it is necessary to measure the explanatory power of these variables through multiple regression 
models.  
Operationalizing the Dependent Variable 
 In order to quantify meaningful policy change in a given topic area, this study uses the 
aforementioned method of measuring CQ topic coverage (Adler & Wilkerson 2012). 
Specifically, the total number of CQ article column lines per Congress discussing laws passed in 
a given topic represents meaningful legislation in that issue area. This measure is derived from 
the Policy Agendas Project Congressional Quarterly Almanac dataset, which computes 
“ArticleSize” as the “length in column lines of the article” (PAP 2014). Although the dataset 
includes articles discussing both failed and successful legislation, I only define topic coverage as 
the number of lines discussing bills that became public law, a condition Adler and Wilkerson 
(2012) also use, since failed legislation is ultimately meaningless for determining policy change.  
 One should note that the Policy Agendas Project accounts for format changes of articles 
over time. Because the average number of words per column line in early Almanac years is half 
as much as that of later years, the Project halves the number of column lines counted per article 
in early years. This variable is therefore a consistent measure over time.  
Defining Topic Areas 
 The Policy Agendas Project 2014 Topic Codebook defines 20 major topic areas and 220 
subtopic areas by numerical code. All datasets used in this analysis have categorized legislation 
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according to these major and subtopic codes. Adler & Wilkerson (2012) also use Policy Agendas 
Project topic and subtopic codes to define the issue legislation they include in their study.  
 Science legislation includes laws with eight of the ten “Space, Science, Technology and 
Communication” codes. The two excluded codes are “Telephone and Telecommunication 
Regulation” and “Broadcast Industry Regulation,” since these two refer to communication 
legislation, rather than science policy. Stine (2009) clarifies that science policy is involved in the 
following additional issue areas: health, environment, energy, transportation, defense, and 
education, through research and development efforts. In turn, I also define science as having the 
“research and development” codes under the first five of these six topic areas. Lastly, I include 
legislation with the “Education Excellence” code, only if the bill refers to science-related 
education.  
 Health, transportation, education, and CD&H legislation include public laws with all the 
codes listed under these major topic areas, except the research and development codes that are 
being defined as science. Using these codes for both science and one of the other issue areas 
would not be an accurate measure of policy change in a given topic area, as there would be issue 
overlap.  
Independent Variables 
1. Issue Specialization 
 As previously discussed, committees allow legislators to gain specialized knowledge in 
specific issue areas. Therefore, committee activity acts as a proxy variable for expert knowledge 
and issue specialization. I use the PAP Congressional Hearings dataset, which records each US 
congressional hearing from 1946 to 2013 and codes them by PAP topic areas. I thus measure 
committee activity as the total number of days per Congress committees hold referral hearings in 
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each topic area. I exclude non-referral committees, as these focus on “issues for which [the 
committee has] not received a bill referral” and therefore do not directly “shape the fate of bills” 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2002, p. 99).  
2. Partisan Characteristics  
 Partisan characteristics include: the party composition of the legislature, the extent of 
divided government, and the party of the president. To measure the effect of congressional party 
composition on policy change, this study uses the percentage of seats per Congress occupied by 
Democrats (History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives 2015; Senate Historical 
Office 2015). The Republican percentage of Congress is not included as a variable, because it 
would provide the same measure but in the reverse direction.  
Divided government occurs when the party controlling the executive branch is different 
from the party controlling at least one chamber in Congress (Bessette & Pitney 2013). Because 
the dummy variable cannot gauge the extent of divided government, but simply indicates its 
presence, the percentage of seats in Congress occupied by a member of the president’s political 
party is also used to measure divided government (Light, 1982). The political party of the 
president during each Congress and the presence of divided government are both made into 
dummy variables (0=Democrat, 1=Republican; 0=undivided, 1=divided). 
3. External Mood and Support 
 As review of literature indicates, both the president and the public likely influence 
congressional policy decisions in specific issue areas. Gelman et al. (2015) assembled a dataset 
of unique presidential policy proposals between 1947 and 2008, constructed from the Public 
Papers of the President and coded according to the PAP codebook. Using the coding definitions 
described earlier, I select the total number of presidential policy proposals in each issue area per 
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Congress to quantify the president’s legislative issue agendas, such as his science legislative 
agenda. I also use the total number of presidential policy proposals in all issue areas per 
Congress to measure the president’s overall legislative activity.  
I also include electoral margin, or the difference between electoral votes the president 
won in his election and those of the losing presidential candidate as a measure of public support 
for the president, which likely influences congressional responses to presidential policy 
proposals (Gelman et al., 2015; Leip, 2015). For years during which presidents came to office 
due to presidential death or impeachment, I use the electoral margin earned by the previous 
president.  
 Using Stimson and Coggins’ (2014) Policy Moods dataset and custom series application, 
I aggregate mood scores for each topic into an average general score per Congress between 1947 
and 2010. This score estimates broad public support for overall congressional policy activity. I 
also measure the effects of removing general mood score or replacing it with issue-specific mood 
score, but note that issue-specific data is often only available starting in the 1970s and is 
therefore less useful for this study.  
 As previously determined, religiosity is an indirect measure of public support for certain 
issue areas, such as health and education. Consequently, I include the average percentage per 
Congress of Americans who “would say religion is [very important] in [their] life” as a measure 
of public religiosity (Gallup, 2015).  
4. Federal Budget  
Lastly, the study includes the size of the federal budget, by recording the average federal 
surplus/deficit in millions of dollars during each Congress between 1947 and 2010 (Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2014).  
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Statistical Models 
 I use multiple regression models to determine the effects of these independent variables 
on topic-specific policy change. For each issue area (science, health, transportation, education 
and CD&H), I develop a model with CQ topic coverage as the dependent variable, by examining 
1,224 CQ records of public law. Each CQ record discusses only one public law, since the Policy 
Agendas Project separates articles containing multiple laws into unique records. I include the 
eleven aforementioned independent variables and identify significant predictor variables for each 
topic, based on a significance threshold requiring the p-value to be below 0.05.  
 Although social scientists occasionally use lagged dependent variables in time series 
analyses, I choose to exclude this variable from the model. I do so, because scholars increasingly 
contend that “the lagged dependent variable specification is too problematic for use in most 
situations,” as it underestimates the effects of explanatory variables, while overestimating its 
own effect (Keele, 2005, p.1). Achen (2001) argues that lagged investigations of the federal 
budget and nuclear arms race, for example, have produced artificial and inaccurate results. In 
turn, I omit the lagged DV, because it would likely underestimate the explicatory power of the 
independent variables, making the results unreliable.   
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Results  
Table 1: Predictors of Topic-Specific Policy Change between the 80th and 111th Congress  
Independent Variable Science Health Transportation Education CD&H 
Committee Activity  
(Referral Hearings) 14.05* 1.22 7.87 8.38 8.62 
Democrat Percentage of Congress 1896.00 4987.00 7139.00 11890* 10930.00 
Divided Government -311.0 -337.4 -336.8 -242.8 -182.9 
Presidential Party  
Congressional Seats Percentage -3864.00 -15720.00 -9028.00 -4185.00 -4704.00 
Presidential Party 39.87 -681.50 -391.60 -290.40 -1618.00 
Total Presidential Proposals -0.38 12.30 22.46** -3.67 10.68 
Topic-Specific  
Presidential Proposals 16.86 -7.06 177.6* 71.23* -64.91 
Mood Score -89.79 84.39 307.10 -73.86 -205.60 
Religion -10030.00 -56170** -59210* -38900** -17810.00 
Electoral Margin -0.38 7.33 7.27 4.40 7.81 
Federal Surplus/Deficit 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.007501* 0.00 
Multiple R-squared 0.61 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.72 
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.49 
N 31 31 31 31 31 
Significance Codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 
N=observations (number of congressional terms) 
 
Explanatory Variables of Science Policy Change 
Results reveal that only committee activity, or the amount of days Congress dedicates to 
science referral hearings, significantly correlates with CQ coverage of science laws. Controlling 
for all other variables, meaningful science policy increases when committee activity increases, 
thereby confirming original expectations and substantiating existing science policy theories 
arguing that Congress depends on expert knowledge for science policy decisions. Contrary to the 
original hypothesis, partisan characteristics, external support, and the federal budget lack any 
appreciable impact on science policy change.  
Comparison of Science Indicators to those for Other Issues 
 Not only does committee activity exclusively shape science policy, rather than any of the 
other four issue areas, but explanatory variables also differ for all examined topics. Unlike 
original predictions, even science, health and education are determined by different factors, 
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despite the seeming overlap of subtopics. Health policy negatively and significantly correlates 
with public religiosity alone. Committee activity, partisan characteristics, budget size and other 
measures of external support all fail to explain health policy change. However, as religiosity 
decreases, health policy increases, suggesting that these topics conflict and that congressmen are 
willing to prioritize religion over healthcare.  
The sizes of the president’s general policy agenda and transportation-specific policy 
agenda significantly and positively correlate with transportation policy change, while American 
religiosity negatively and significantly correlates. All other factors are insignificant. While the 
president’s policy agenda is an expected indicator, religion does not have an apparent causal 
relationship with transportation policy and is thus likely reflecting the effect of another factor not 
included in this study.  
 Education policy change requires the most congressional consideration of political 
environment, as measures of partisan dynamics, external support, and the federal budget all play 
a significant role. Specifically, the increased percentage of Democrats in Congress amplifies 
education legislation. Likewise, presidential support of education and larger federal budgets 
additionally increase education policy initiatives. Similar to health and transportation policy, 
public religiosity negatively correlates with education policy, indicating that congressmen will 
not forego support from religious constituents for education that threatens their beliefs. 
 Community development and housing policy is the only issue area for which none of 
these independent variables are significant. In turn, specialized knowledge, partisan dynamics, 
external support and size of the federal budget all fail to explain this topic. It is thus likely that 
environmental events, such as housing crises, provide the most impact on this topic.  
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 The only overlap between issue areas occurs when religion negatively correlates with 
health, transportation and education, suggesting that American religiosity plays a broader role in 
policymaking. However, congressional behavior is almost entirely unique for each issue area.  
 Appendix A examines how results change when issue-specific mood score replaces 
general mood score. Topic mood score removes the effects of all significant variables, as none of 
the factors substantially explain any of the five topics. However, this set of models investigates 
nearly half the number of CQ records of public law and considerably shorten the examined 
period of time, due to lack of available topic mood data. In turn, results from this set are 
unreliable and should not override conclusions emerging from Table 1, which has a much 
broader scope.   
Appendix B reveals that when both topic-specific and general mood score are excluded 
from the model, the only differences that arise occur with transportation policy, as presidential 
support for transportation policy and religion are now insignificant explanatory factors. Because 
the significance of religion is likely reflecting another factor not included in this study, the most 
significant finding that emerges when mood is included is that the president’s transportation 
agenda influences policy change in this area.  
Discussion 
 Two especially noteworthy implications transpire from the results. First, Congress relies 
almost exclusively on specialized knowledge when making science policy decisions and ignores 
pressures from party leaders, the president, and the public. Policymakers likely justify this 
behavior by acknowledging that science is too technical for average citizens, or even themselves, 
to properly understand without the aid of experts. This trend validates the concern of policy 
theorists that “as decision-making [grows] more technical and expert-driven, citizens [are] 
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progressively distanced from the process…that form[s] the backbone of…[policy] decisions” 
(Jasanoff, 2005, p. 386). One might intuitively wonder why Congress has not produced more 
laws that beneficially expand scientific efforts, if scientific knowledge seemingly determines 
policy decisions in this area. Weingart (2002) explains that “the demand for scientific expertise” 
in politics diminishes the legitimacy of science as an objective, disinterested field by introducing 
political pressures into their work (p.704). In turn, scientists shape their findings in a way that 
supports political goals, thus resulting in irrational policy decisions.  
 Despite the negative side effects, it is apparent that the involvement of expert knowledge 
in politics increases science policy outputs, given the positive correlation between the two. One 
would therefore be amiss to eliminate expert opinions from policy decisions, and this type of 
knowledge is of course valuable. However, science policy is distinctive from most of the other 
issue areas in that it does not culminate from conventional democratic pressures, such as public 
opinion or presidential support that either shapes or reflects that opinion (Gelman et al., 2015). 
Perhaps this distancing of citizens from science policy decisions explains the narrow range of 
science policy change compared to that of the other issue areas (Figures 1-5). Results in fact 
demonstrate that pressures from the public, the president, political parties, or a combination of all 
three shape health, transportation and education policy, which have more than double the amount 
of maximal policy change than does science and higher averages of policy change per Congress.  
Conceivably, these conventional policy actors refrain from advocating science policy 
action, because they lack the knowledge to support their claims as well as the experts upon 
whom Congress so faithfully relies. If party leaders, the president, or the public were encouraged 
to participate more in science policy promotion and to give those with specialized knowledge a 
less authoritarian role, there would be a larger impetus for policy change, simply because there is 
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strength in numbers. One might attempt to counter this claim by observing that CD&H has larger 
outputs than science but also seems to ignore these same pressures. However, various 
environmental circumstances, such as housing crises, force legislators to act immediately in this 
issue area, and legislators can easily gain electoral support by improving communities in which 
their constituents live, even if their voters do not deliberately request these improvements. In 
turn, it would make sense for Congress to produce large policy change in CD&H without having 
to gauge public support.  
Contrarily, most circumstances that require scientific assistance, such as global warming, 
appear less urgent to Congress, because effects are more long-term in their exposure. Likewise, 
congressmen will not easily gain support from most of its constituents by improving science, 
because effects are less direct and immediate. Therefore, Congress has no reason to produce 
large policy outputs in science unless the public begins to ask for them. It is therefore necessary 
for Congress to make science policy deliberations less technical and less expert-reliant, so that 
citizens will be more willing to get involved. To substantially drive science policy change, expert 
advise is not enough.   
 The second meaningful conclusion developing from the results is that Congress relies on 
diverse factors when approaching policies of different issue areas. This observation is important 
for political scientists, as it requires new research initiatives that investigate trends in specific 
issue areas, rather than overall congressional policy. To demonstrate the need for this type of 
research, I will provide examples of two variables that predict general policy trends but not 
issue-specific trends. 
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Divided Government Influences General Policy but not Issue-Specific Policy 
A number of scholars have aggregated issue areas into general congressional policy and 
found that divided government either hinders or aids policy productivity (Mayhew, 1991; 
Howell, Adler, Cameron & Riemann, 2000; and Maltzman & Shipan, 2008;  
Nicholson-Crotty & Miller, 2011). Yet, divided government does not have a significant impact 
on any of the examined issue areas, one way or the other. This finding does not mean that 
divided government has no influence on any issue areas; however, it is clear that generalizations 
of this relationship do not reflect all topics. In fact, the differences between these scholars’ 
findings might result from the potentially varying impact of divided government across issue 
areas. Evidently, researchers need to investigate the effect of divided government on other topics 
this study does not examine, in order to obtain a complete picture of this variable’s weight.  
Presidential Agendas Impact General Policy, but not Science, Health, and CD&H 
By examining general policymaking, undistinguished by topic area, scholars find that the 
president’s policy agenda substantially influences congressional legislation (Adler & Lapinski, 
2012; Cohen, 2012; Edwards & Barrett, 2000; Peterson, 1990). Yet, this study reveals that the 
president’s policy agenda, whether general or topic-specific, only significantly influences 
transportation and education policy change, but has no considerable effect on science, health or 
CD&H. This is not to say these scholars had incorrect findings, but rather had incomplete 
findings, which exaggerate the influence the president has on policy change.  
Undoubtedly, political scholars must analyze policy change in each issue area, in order to 
obtain a comprehensive picture of the dynamics that result in policy change. However, the 
question then is: why is congressional behavior issue-dependent? While it is not that surprising 
that Congress relies on specialized knowledge for convoluted science policy, the finding that 
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predictors vary so drastically between the other issue areas is not necessarily intuitive. For 
instance, why do partisan factors, external support, and the federal budget influence education 
policy, but health policy initiatives primarily depend on American religiosity? For that matter, 
why would Congress not consider partisan characteristics, external support, and the federal 
budget for all policy areas?  
 It is necessary to conduct in-depth studies within each of these issue areas to fully answer 
these questions; however, I will offer a possible explanation, by first analyzing why education 
policy change depends on a broader range of factors than do the other areas. According to the 
Policy Agendas Project (2014), Americans frequently classify health as a “most important 
problem” and practically never characterize transportation, CD&H and science as such. In turn, it 
is clear that health is consistently of high citizen high priority, while the others are of visibly low 
priority. The prioritization of education, however, is less straightforward, since a modest 
proportion of the public only sometimes characterizes education as a “most important issue”. It 
thus makes sense that, since public prioritization of health, transportation, CD&H and science is 
well known, Congress only needs to assess a small number of political factors when making 
policy decisions in these areas. Contrarily, public prioritization of education is less obvious, 
since it is neither extremely high nor extremely low, so Congress must consider four factors: the 
party composition of Congress, presidential agenda, religion, and budget size.  
 Assuming this explanation is correct, why do the issue areas with obvious levels of public 
prioritization also vary by predictor variables? One apparent reason is that health is the only 
consistently high priority issue area. Given this regularly high prioritization of health, it is 
unnecessary for Congress to gauge public, presidential, or party support. Likewise, legislators do 
not need to consider the budget, because they theoretically would not want to sacrifice health 
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initiatives for lower priority policy initiatives. Consequently, Congress only needs to identify 
types of health policy that will be controversial, which often occur when laws conflict with 
religion, such as the AIDS policies discussed earlier. Congress thus focuses primarily on 
American religiosity when addressing this topic. 
 For similar reasons, Congress does not need to assess many of these political factors for 
low priority issue areas, because their lower urgency is consistent and well known. Most likely, 
Congress relies more on circumstantial events that provide rare impetuses for policy change. For 
example, the surge in housing foreclosures between 2007 and 2009 forced Congress to change 
CD&H policy (Immergluck, 2009). It would make sense that only environmental factors 
influence CD&H policy, since no political variables are significant, which indicates that further 
research in this topic is necessary.  
 Transportation is likewise a low priority issue area for the public, which is why only 
presidential support and religion are significant predictors of policy change. As previously 
mentioned, religion has no clear relationship with transportation, so it is likely representative of 
another significant indicator not included in this study. I will therefore focus more on explaining 
the relationship between presidential support and transportation policy change. Notably, 
presidents have made executive orders in transportation, ranging between 0 and 20 per year since 
the 1940s, while the other four examined issue areas have only received a maximum of 5 
executive orders per year during the same time period (PAP, 2014). Furthermore, there was a 
much larger number of executive orders in this topic compared to the other four topics between 
the 1940s and the 1980s (PAP, 2014). Mayer & Price (2002) propose that presidents use 
executive orders to cause significant policy change. Because transportation has historically been 
a relatively popular issue area in which presidents pursue policy change, Congress may have 
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developed the behavior of looking to the president’s agenda for this topic, to avoid the president 
circumventing their legislation. Given the low public priority of this issue area, it would make 
sense if environmental events shape this policy area, as well. In fact, an escalation in aviation 
policy occurred in the 1970s, right after the Boeing 747 was created, the first jet capable of 
seating 450 passengers, and after the Soviet Union made the first supersonic commercial aircraft, 
driving American competitiveness (NASA, 2010).  
 As previously discussed, science focuses primarily on expertise, because it has been 
characterized as a technical issue area that is too complicated for average citizens to understand. 
Its low prioritization among the public could be a cause or result of this dependence on expertise. 
Most likely, this relationship is mutually causal. Congress established this area as a technical one 
during the 1970s when scientific experts began participating much more in political debates 
(Weingart, 2006), thereby distancing citizens from the topic. This distancing likely made citizens 
feel powerless when it came to science advocacy, resulting in their apathy and long-term low 
prioritization of the issue. This apathy then only fortified the original reliance of Congress on 
expertise, creating a cycle of citizen distancing and apathy.  
Conclusion 
 This paper has demonstrated the importance of investigating issue-specific trends in 
congressional behavior, by revealing that the factors influencing change in each topic vary not 
only with those shaping general policymaking, but also with those influencing other issue areas. 
Results also validate concerns of science policy theorists, who argue that science policy 
processes have become too complex and consequently exclude conventional democratic 
pressures. This finding simultaneously provides an enduring theory of science policy change in 
response to the shortage of existing explanations. Lastly, the study has provided a promising 
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explanation for differences between issue-area predictors, primarily based on historical public 
prioritization of policy topics.  
 The paper urges political scientists to coordinate future studies focusing on specific issue-
areas, in order to produce a more comprehensive understanding of legislative behavior. To 
supplement this study, future research should investigate the role external circumstantial factors 
play in the five observed issue areas and identify other variables that might further demonstrate 
legislative reliance upon expertise in science.  
 By highlighting Congress’s nearly exclusive dependence upon specialized knowledge 
when contemplating science policy change, the analysis most importantly emphasizes the need to 
reform the way lawmakers decide on science policy. Specifically, researchers must identify 
methods that combine expertise with citizen involvement, so that advocacy for science policy 
increases, compelling Congress to produce more substantial science policy changes. While 
scientific knowledge is always valuable, some form of citizen, presidential, or party participation 
is essential for significant policy change in a democratic society.  
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Appendix A: Predictors of Topic-Specific Policy Change (with Issue-Specific Mood Score) 
Independent Variable Science Health Transportation Education CD&H 
Committee Activity 
(Referral Hearings) 7.73 142.00 -773.90 11.80 7.73 
Democrat Percentage of Congress -1971.00 -319400.00 310800.00 22320.00 -1971.00 
Divided Government -471.40 -26530.00 42120.00 -2657.00 -471.40 
Presidential Party  
Congressional Seats Percentage -5455.00 -83010.00 -28630.00 -2133.00 -5455.00 
Presidential Party -578.70 18640.00 -25770.00 679.40 -578.70 
Total Presidential Proposals 2.82 3.01 -65.53 -4.81 2.82 
Topic-Specific  
Presidential Proposals 44.43 -1444.00 -2140.00 112.4 . 44.43 
Topic Mood Score -85.72 5890.00 -11410.00 27.83 -85.72 
Religion -11800.00 803000.00 435300.00 -61530.00 -11800.00 
Electoral Margin 0.67 85.50 -237.90 3.81 0.67 
Federal Surplus/Deficit 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 
Multiple R-squared 0.91 0.8276 0.9054 0.6771 0.91 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7349 -0.8964 0.7702 0.2824 0.7349 
N 18 12 12 26 18 
Significance Codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1  
N=Observations (number of congressional terms) 
 
Appendix B: Predictors of Topic-Specific Policy Change between 80th and 111th Congresses 
(without Mood Score) 
 
Independent Variable Science Health Transportation Education CD&H 
Committee Activity 
(Referral Hearings) 15.06* -1.59 4.40 9.46 9.10 
Democrat Percentage of Congress 452.10 6297.00 9520.00 11250* 8170.00 
Divided Government -384.00 -3242.00 -2620.00 -2569 . -2000.00 
Presidential Party 
Congressional Seats Percentage -3710.00 -14610.00 -5570.00 -4629.00 -5230.00 
Presidential Party 160.00 -839.40 -542 -200.40 -1500.00 
Total Presidential Proposals 0.69 11.24 16.81* -3.99 13.5 
Topic-Specific Presidential 
Proposals 7.57 -5.04 -115.9 . 76.27* -86.1 
Religion -9450.00 -56400** -55700.00 -39170** -13400.00 
Electoral Margin -0.15 7.77 7.05 4.26 8.14 
Federal Surplus/Deficit 0.00 0.01 .00978 0.00779* .00237 
Multiple R-squared 0.5827 0.6714 0.6439 0.69 0.6877 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3741 0.4523 0.4213 0.49 0.4647 
N 31 31 31 31 31 
Significance Codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 
N= Observations (number of congressional terms) 
 	
